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Abstract
During recent decades, many new models have emerged in pure and applied economic theory
according to which agents’ choices may be sensitive to ambiguity in the uncertainty that faces
them. The exchange between Epstein (2010) and Klibanoff et al. (2012) identified a notable
behavioral issue that distinguishes sharply between two classes of models of ambiguity sensitivity
that are importantly different. The two classes are exemplified by the ˛-maxmin expected utility
(MEU) model and the smooth ambiguity model, respectively; and the issue is whether or not a
desire to hedge independently resolving ambiguities contributes to an ambiguity-averse agent’s
preference for a randomized act. Building on this insight, we implement an experiment whose design
provides a qualitative test that discriminates between the two classes of models. Among subjects
identified as ambiguity sensitive, we find greater support for the class exemplified by the smooth
ambiguity model; the relative support is stronger among subjects identified as ambiguity averse.
This finding has implications for applications that rely on specific models of ambiguity preference.
(JEL: C91, D01, D03, D81, G02)
1. Introduction
Decision makers (DMs) choosing between acts are said to face ambiguity if they
are uncertain about the probability distribution over states of the world. Over the
past three decades, a large decision-theoretic literature has developed, inspired partly
by the intuitive view that it is often implausible that a DM can confidently select a
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single probability distribution over states of the world to summarize her uncertainty,
so ambiguity is ubiquitous for decision making in the real world. This literature,
reviewed, for example, by Etner et al. (2012) and Gilboa and Marinacci (2013),
also draws important inspiration from numerous experimental studies, largely built on
Ellsberg’s (1961) classic examples, which show that subjects often adjust their behavior
in response to ambiguity in ways that cannot be accounted for by subjective expected
utility theory (for surveys, see Camerer and Weber 1992; Wakker 2010; Trautmann
and van de Kuilen 2015). For instance, many subjects display an ambiguity-averse
attitude: intuitively put, being inclined to choose actions whose consequences are
more robust to the perceived ambiguity. Recent applied economic theory explores how
such departures from subjective expected utility theory in the face of plausible forms
of uncertainty may affect a range of economic phenomena.1
The pioneering models in the decision theory literature on ambiguity, and arguably
still the most popular, are the Choquet expected utility model of uncertainty aversion
introduced in Schmeidler (1989) and the maxmin expected utility (MEU) model of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). These models have preference representations that
show the DM behaving as if she has a set of probability distributions that she considers
possible or relevant. Then, an ambiguity-averse attitude is modelled by having the DM
evaluate an act by its minimum expected utility, where the minimum is taken over the set
of probability measures considered possible. In a more general version of this classic
style of model (˛-MEU; Hurwicz 1951; Jaffray 1989; Ghirardato et al. 2004), the
DM evaluates acts by considering a weighted average of the minimum and maximum
expected utility. More recent theories have brought in preference representations which
would allow finer nuances of ambiguity attitude. An important feature that distinguishes
the newer vintage models from the earlier ones is that the new models use aggregation
rules that do not restrict attention to extreme expected utilities. An example is the
smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005) (hereafter KMM).
Given this theoretical development, a natural question is: Are the features that
these newer theories build in empirically compelling? Or, if we were to stick to
the classic models of ambiguity-averse behavior, would we miss any empirically
important aspect of such behavior? As models in both vintages were designed to
capture Ellsberg’s classic examples, the many previous experiments based on decisions
like those examples do not answer these questions as they do not typically discriminate
between the classic and new vintage models. In this paper, we report an experimental
study that does so discriminate: the two classes of models predict qualitatively different
behavior in our design. Thus, the design discriminates between the MEU/˛-MEU
family of models and the smooth ambiguity model, arguably the most popular models
in applications. As we explain in Section 2.3, this divide is not addressed well in the
existing experimental literature.
This is important because, as noted previously, there have been many recent
applications of models of ambiguity-sensitive preferences to the understanding of
1. We give examples below. For wider coverage, see, for example, the discussion and references in Etner
et al. (2012, Section 7), Gilboa and Marinacci (2013, Section 6), and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015,
penultimate section).
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economic phenomena, especially in macroeconomics and financial economics. The
typical paper uses a particular preference model, say the MEU model, to explain a
phenomenon that is hard to explain plausibly using the standard, expected utility,
model. However, some of the explanations depend quite crucially on the particular
model of ambiguity sensitivity used. For example, Epstein and Schneider (2010)
discuss various applications where MEU works to give the desired result but the smooth
model does not because it does not generate kinked indifference curves, as MEU does.
On the other hand, some recent applications in the macrofinance area, such as Ju and
Miao (2012), Jahan-Parvar and Liu (2014), and Collard et al. (2018), rely on being
able to calibrate beliefs and an ambiguity attitude parameter separately, something that
can be done in the smooth ambiguity model, but not in the MEU model. Models of
ambiguity-averse preference have now also been applied outside macroeconomics and
finance, for instance, to climate change policy, where similar issues apply (e.g., the
use of the smooth ambiguity model by Millner et al. (2013) and the use of MEU by
Chambers and Melkonyan (2017)). Here, too, there is no guarantee that results that
hold under one model of ambiguity aversion generalize to other models. The literature
is therefore at a point where clearer guidance on the relative empirical performance of
these models in particular—and the broader classes that they exemplify—is needed.
Our testing strategy is inspired by the second thought experiment of Epstein (2010)
and its generalization in Klibanoff et al. (2012). Our main contribution is to recast
the generalized thought experiment as a real operational design, to extend it with
additional controls, and to run and report the resulting experiment. The testing strategy
is to investigate whether a subject’s preference for a randomized act (compared to
its pure constituents) is influenced by a desire to hedge across ambiguities in a way
that is similar to how diversifying across bets on independent risks hedges those risks.
Models of preferences whose representations focus exclusively on the minimum and/or
maximum expected utilities in the set considered relevant are uninfluenced by such
a desire, in sharp contrast to models whose representations also consider nonextreme
expected utilities. Intuitively, a DM focusing only on the minimum expected utility is
analogous to an infinitely risk-averse agent caring exclusively about the worst possible
outcome and so not about diversifying across independently resolving risks, since such
diversification does not affect the possibility of the worst outcome.
For concreteness and to allow the reader to relate easily to the discussions in Epstein
(2010) and Klibanoff et al. (2012), we explain our design and results in the main text
in terms of the ˛-MEU and smooth ambiguity models, the divide between which is
particularly clear. Appendix C substantiates our claim that the predictions we test also
mark a divide between broader classes of models, besides these two. If (as suggested
above) ambiguity is ubiquitous in real-world decision making, the importance attached
by economists to hedging as a response to uncertainty provides an additional general
motivation for our study which goes beyond models, namely, to investigate hedging of
ambiguities rather than risks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the
˛-MEU and smooth ambiguity preference representations; Section 2.2 presents a
modified version of Epstein’s example and uses it to explain our testing strategy; and
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Section 2.3 contrasts this strategy with others taken in the literature. Section 3 presents
the experimental design, and Section 4 the results, of our main study. Section 5
introduces some issues of robustness and generality, which are examined further in
Appendices A, B, and C; it also briefly presents a follow-up study in which one aspect
of the design of the main experiment is varied, for reasons explained at that point.
Section 6 concludes the main text. An Online Appendix contains further details of the
results, experimental procedures, and instructions.
2. Background
2.1. Preference Representations
Formally, the DM’s choices are acts, maps from contingent states of the world to
consequences, which include simple lotteries with real outcomes. We focus on two
models of preferences over acts: the ˛-MEU model and the smooth ambiguity model.
Each captures the idea that the DM does not know the probabilities of the states by
postulating a set of probability measures over the states that she considers possible.
The models differ in respect of how that set informs her evaluations of acts.
In the ˛-MEU model, an act f is evaluated by
VM .f / D ˛ min
p2P

Ep .u .f //

C .1  ˛/ max
p2P

Ep .u .f //

;
where u is a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, ˛ a fixed weight, and P the
set of probability measures p over the states. The operator Ep takes expectations with
respect to the measure p. Attitude towards pure risk is characterized by the shape of
u, while attitude towards ambiguity is characterized by the weight ˛; in particular, the
greater the value of ˛, the more ambiguity averse the preference. With ˛ D 1, we get
the MEU representation.
In the smooth ambiguity model, an act f is evaluated by
VS .f / D E '

Ep2P .u .f //

;
where ' is an increasing function mapping utilities to reals and  is a subjective
probability over the elements of P . The operators E and Ep take expectations with
respect to the measures  and p, respectively. Thus,  represents the DM’s subjective
uncertainty about the different probabilities deemed possible and, in this sense, is a
second-order belief. Attitudes towards ambiguity are characterized by the shape of ',
given u. In particular, a concave ' characterizes ambiguity aversion, which is therefore
modelled as an aversion to mean-preserving spreads in the distribution of expected
utilities induced jointly by  and u. When ' is linear or  is degenerate, the smooth
ambiguity model collapses to a subjective expected utility (SEU) model.
Although these models have some common features, there are also marked
differences between them, one of which drives our testing strategy as we now explain.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvz005/5424161 by U
niversity of N
ottingham
 user on 08 April 2019
Cubitt, van de Kuilen, and Mukerji Models of Ambiguity Attitude: A Qualitative Test 5
TABLE 1. Five acts: (expected) utilities.
B1 B2 R1 R2
f1 1 0 0 0f2 0 0 1 0
mix 12 0
1
2 0
g1
1
2
1
2 0 0
g2 0
1
2
1
2 0
2.2. Conceptual Background
Consider the following variant of the second thought experiment proposed in Epstein
(2010).2 The DM is told that a ball will be drawn from an urn containing a fixed
number of balls, of four different types: B1, B2, R1, and R2. She is also told that the
combined number of balls of types B1 and B2 will equal that of balls of types R1 and
R2 and, finally but importantly, that the relative proportions within the B-component
(B1, B2) and within the R-component (R1, R2) will be determined separately. The DM
considers acts with contingent outcomes c, c and the 50–50 lottery between them. Let
c > c and normalize the utility index u, so that u(c) D 1 and u(c) D 0. The acts to
be considered have state-contingent (expected) utility payoffs as described in Table 1.
To clarify, f1 yields c when a ball of type B1 is drawn and c otherwise, whereas
f2 yields c when type R1 is drawn and c otherwise. The outcome of the act mix is in
part decided by the toss of a fair coin: specifically, for any contingency, there is a 0.5
probability that the outcome is determined by applying f1 and a 0.5 probability that it
is determined by applying f2. In what follows, “mixed act” always refers to this mixed
act and “constituent acts” refers to f1 and f2 (or, in each case, later to their experimental
counterparts). The acts g1 and g2 each yield, in the contingencies for which a cell entry
of 1
2
is shown, either c or c, depending on the toss of a fair coin (and c otherwise).
How might we expect the DM to choose between these acts? The probability of
the event fB1, B2g is objectively known to her and equal to 1/2 (as types B1 and B2
jointly account for half of the balls), but the DM does not know the probability of the
event fB2, R1g. Moreover, the information that she has about balls of type B1 exactly
matches her information about type R1. Thus, the symmetry in the situation suggests
f1  f2; and, it is natural to expect that, if the DM is ambiguity averse, she will have
the strict preference g1  g2.3
2. Readers familiar with Epstein (2010) and Klibanoff et al. (2012) should note that our variant differs
in some respects from Epstein’s thought experiment and that we adopt a notation that is suited to our
experimental design in ways that will emerge below but does not match the earlier papers.
3. Correspondingly, if f1  f2 and the DM is ambiguity seeking, one would expect g2  g1. Ambiguity
neutrality as represented in the model of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) implies that the direction of
preference between f1 and f2 should match that between g1 and g2, so that f1  f2 would imply g1  g2.
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TABLE 2. Example probabilities.
B1 B2 R1 R2
p1
1
10
4
10
1
10
4
10
p2
1
10
4
10
4
10
1
10
p3
4
10
1
10
1
10
4
10
p4
4
10
1
10
4
10
1
10
Although there may be little to disagree about in these claims, it is much more
controversial whether an ambiguity-averse DM would see mixing f1 and f2 as desirable,
compared with either of the latter two acts alone. This issue illustrates one of the main
points of contention between the two models considered in the previous subsection.
The issue is whether, for an ambiguity-averse DM who is indifferent between f1 and f2,
f1  f2  mix or f1  f2  mix
would obtain. In the ˛-MEU model, the former condition will hold, whereas in the
smooth ambiguity model, the latter condition will hold. In words, the issue that
divides the models is whether, in this situation, an ambiguity-averse DM would or
would not value the averaging that the mixed act offers.
To illustrate the point of contention, it is useful to write down a concrete set of
probability measures fp1, . . . , p4g that we suppose to be those considered by the DM
and show in Table 2. In the context of the smooth ambiguity model, think of these as
probabilities that are given positive weight by the measure  and, importantly, with
the weights for p2 and p3 equal.
These measures respect the given information, in that, for each i D 1, 2, 3, 4, pi(B1
[ B2) D pi(R1 [ R2) D 1/2; and, as p2 and p3 have equal weight, there is complete
symmetry between the B-component and the R-component. The measures respect the
independence of the two components in that fixing a “marginal” over (B1, B2) does not
restrict the “marginal” over (R1, R2), or vice versa. The expected utilities generated by
applying each of the measures pi from Table 2 to the acts from Table 1 are as shown
in Table 3.
First, consider acts f1 and f2. Their expected utilities coincide under p1 and p4,
but differ from each other under p2 and p3. To see why, note from Table 1 that the
evaluation of f1 depends on the ratio B1: B2 but not on R1: R2, whereas the evaluation
of f2 depends on the ratio R1: R2 but not on B1: B2; and then note, from Table 2, that
these ratios coincide under p1 and p4 but not under p2 or p3. In contrast, the evaluation
of mix depends on both the ratios, but has half the exposure to the uncertainty about
each, compared to each of the constituent acts. The point of contention turns on the
significance of these facts.
From the perspective of the ˛-MEU model, the extremes of the possible expected
utilities are what matter for the evaluation of an act. The diversification aspect of the
comparison between f1, f2, and mix is irrelevant, because the minimum and maximum
possible expected utilities are the same under each of these three acts, as Table 3
shows. So, according to this model, the DM will be indifferent between f1, f2, and mix,
regardless of her preference over g1 and g2.
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TABLE 3. Resulting expected utilities.
p1 p2 p3 p4
f1 110 110 410 410
f2 110 410 110 410
mix 110
2:5
10
2:5
10
4
10
g1
2:5
10
2:5
10
2:5
10
2:5
10
g2
2:5
10
4
10
1
10
2:5
10
However, from the perspective of the smooth ambiguity model, the mixed act
provides a hedging of two separate ambiguities, one involving each of the two
components, just as diversifying across bets on independent risks provides a hedging
of risks. The benefit of such diversification to an ambiguity-averse DM is captured
through a concave ', in that mean-preserving spreads in the subjective distribution of
expected utilities generated by an act are disliked. Since p2 and p3 have equal weight,
each of f1 and f2 yields a mean-preserving spread in expected utilities compared with
mix, as Table 3 shows. Thus, according to the smooth ambiguity model, the mixed act is
preferred to its constituents by any ambiguity-averse DM. To generalize, the distinctive
prediction of the smooth ambiguity model for the case where p2 and p3 have equal
weight is that an ambiguity-averse DM will prefer not just g1 to g2 but also mix to each
of f1 and f2, and, correspondingly, an ambiguity-seeking DM (convex ') would have
the reverse preference in each case; and an ambiguity-neutral DM (linear ') would be
indifferent between g1 and g2, and between mix and each of its constituents.
It is important to note a key feature of the perspective of the smooth ambiguity
model. Each of p2 and p3, the measures across which the mixed act smooths the
expected utility relative to its constituents, corresponds to a situation where there is
one “marginal” over component (B1, B2) and a different “marginal” over (R1, R2).
Thus, it is precisely because it is uncertain whether the two components are identical
to one another (so leading the DM to consider p2 and p3) that the diversification
provided by the mixed act is seen by the smooth model as valuable to an ambiguity-
averse DM. If, instead, the two components were known to be identical (and so only
p1 and p4 were considered), smooth ambiguity preferences would display indifference
between the mixed act and its constituents, just as ˛-MEU preferences would. Thus,
the key difference between smooth ambiguity preferences and ˛-MEU preferences
that we have highlighted is whether the DM values hedging across ambiguities that
are separate, in the sense that the uncertainty about the probability governing one
component resolves separately from the analogous uncertainty for the other component.
This insight is crucial to our experimental design, as explained in Section 3.
2.3. Related Literature
Our experimental design identifies subjects whose behavior is sensitive to ambiguity,
categorizing them as ambiguity averse or seeking, and determines whether they behave
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according to the ˛-MEU model or the smooth ambiguity model in a setup of the kind
described in Section 2.2. The tests of whether this is so rely on qualitative features of
the data, that is, binary preferences (revealed, as explained in what follows, by ordinal
comparisons of certainty equivalents). None of our tests require estimates of model
parameters. It is useful to bear these points in mind as we discuss how this experiment
fits in with other recent literature. We concentrate on papers whose main objective is
to distinguish empirically between models similar to those we consider.4
The experimental approach of Halevy (2007) is to determine whether a subject
may be classified as ambiguity neutral/averse/seeking (using an Ellsberg-style
determination) while also checking how the subject evaluates an objective two-stage
lottery, in particular whether the evaluation is consistent with reduction of objective
compound lotteries (ROCL).5 The main finding is that ambiguity aversion is strongly
associated with violation of ROCL. Using this finding, the study sifts evidence for or
against various models of ambiguity sensitivity. For instance, while the ˛-MEU model
predicts a zero association with ROCL, in several models in (what Halevy terms)
the “recursive expected utility” class, ambiguity sensitivity logically implies violation
of ROCL. However, under the assumptions of KMM, there is no logical connection
between ambiguity aversion (or, seeking) and reduction of compound objective lotteries
in the smooth ambiguity model.6 Hence, the strategy based on ROCL is not as useful
in distinguishing ˛-MEU from the smooth model in KMM as it is in making other
distinctions.7
Conte and Hey (2013) observe subjects’ choices between prospects and study
how well the data fit various models of decision making. Unlike that of Halevy,
the identification strategy is not based primarily on qualitative features of the data.
Instead, they estimate parametric preference models, in particular, the SEU, ˛-MEU,
and smooth ambiguity models. One part of the study fits the models subject-by-subject,
while another part estimates a mixture model. However, the uncertain prospects the
subjects are given to choose between are still objective two-stage lotteries of the kind
used in Halevy (2007). So, the point still applies that subjects who are strictly ambiguity
averse/seeking, and whose preferences conform to the smooth model, may not evaluate
4. Attanasi et al. (2014) test the smooth model using its predictions in a portfolio choice experiment,
but do not aim to discriminate between models. Many other empirical papers are primarily concerned
with measuring ambiguity sensitivity rather than with testing models. Cubitt et al. (2018) do this using
the smooth ambiguity model and Ahn et al. (2014) using both the smooth ambiguity and ˛-MEU models.
Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) survey a range of model-free measures of the sensitivity.
5. See Abdellaoui et al. (2015) for an extension of this testing strategy.
6. See the discussions following KMM’s Remark 1 and immediately preceding and in footnote 8 in
Klibanoff et al. (2012).
7. It is important that we refer to the smooth model as developed by KMM here. Seo (2009) obtains a
representation that uses an identical functional form to represent preferences defined on a choice domain
that differs from KMM’s by including multistage lotteries but excluding second-order acts. In this domain
and under the axioms applied by Seo (but unlike in KMM), violation of ROCL is equivalent to a concave '.
Because of this, Halevy’s experiment does distinguish between MEU, SEU, and Seo’s preference model. In
Section 5.2, we report on a follow-up to our main experiment motivated by the divide between the smooth
model of KMM and the model of Seo (2009).
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such lotteries any differently from those whose preferences satisfy expected utility
theory. Hey, Lotito and Maffioletti (2010)8 and Hey and Pace (2014) also compare
the descriptive and predictive performance of particular parameterizations of several
“non-two-stage probability models” of behavior, in these cases using ambiguity that is
generated by a bingo blower. But the smooth ambiguity model is not one of those they
consider and, despite their attractiveness in some contexts, it is unlikely that bingo
blower designs could deliver the control over beliefs that our design exploits, as we
explain in the next section.
Taking a different approach, Ahn et al.’s (2014) experiment studies a simulation of
a standard economic choice problem: each subject allocates a given budget between
three assets, each of which pays depending on the color of the ball drawn from
a single Ellsberg-style three-color urn, while the prices of assets are exogenously
varied.9 Different parametric preference models of choice under uncertainty imply
different asset demand functions. Ahn et al.’s (2014) testing strategy distinguishes quite
effectively between two classes of models: those that have kinked indifference curves
(e.g., ˛-MEU and the rank-dependent utility model) and those with smooth indifference
curves (e.g., SEU and smooth ambiguity, even if ambiguity averse), as kinked
and smooth indifference curves imply demand functions with different qualitative
characteristics in their setting. However, the identification is more problematic within
each class of model. Indeed, if a subject’s preferences are ambiguity averse and conform
to the smooth ambiguity model, qualitative properties of choice data in this experiment
do not distinguish her from an SEU subject. Similarly, an ˛-MEU preference is difficult
to distinguish qualitatively from first-order risk aversion as models of first-order risk
aversion where preferences are fully probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of
Machina and Schmeidler (1992) also bring in kinks in different ways—for example,
the rank dependence model of Quiggin (1982) and the prospect theory of Tversky and
Kahneman (1992).
Hayashi and Wada (2009) investigate the choice between lotteries where the
subject has imprecise (objective) information about probability distributions defining
the lotteries. Although they do not specifically test the ˛-MEU model against a smooth
ambiguity model, a finding relevant to our discussion is that their subjects appear
to care about more than just the best-case and worst-case probability distributions.
However, their strategy for detecting this influence of nonextreme points (in the set of
possible probabilities) does not exploit the hedging motive that we stress.
In contrast, Andreoni et al. (2014) study subjects’ attitudes to mixtures between
subjective and objective bets. As different models that allow for ambiguity sensitivity
relax the Independence axiom in different ways, their test can potentially separate
some of the different models (in particular MEU vs. SEU vs. the smooth ambiguity
8. See also Kothiyal et al. (2014).
9. Bossaerts et al.’s (2009) experiment employs a choice problem very similar to Ahn et al.’s (2014), but
in the context of a market where prices are determined by trading among subjects.
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model). But, they point out that their test of the smooth ambiguity model is conditional
on particular functional forms, unlike the one we apply in the present study.
Finally, Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015) use elicited “matching probabilities” to
distinguish between several models, including the ˛-MEU and smooth ambiguity
models. Their approach differs from ours by its use of indifferences expressed on
a probability scale, rather than on a monetary scale, to indicate preferences and by
their focus on the ability of models to account for observed differences in ambiguity
attitudes between the domains of gains and losses, respectively.10 We set the latter
issue aside by concentrating on the domain of gains, in order to focus on the hedging
issue at the heart of the dispute between Epstein (2010) and Klibanoff et al. (2012) to
which we now return.
3. Experimental Design
3.1. Core of Design
Our design has at its heart an implementation of the theoretical setup of Section 2.2. In
place of an ambiguous urn containing balls of four different types, we used specially
constructed decks of cards, divisible into the four standard suits. We implemented the
component (B1, B2) as the composition by suit of the black-suit (henceforth “black”)
cards and the component (R1, R2) as the composition by suit of the red-suit (henceforth
“red”) cards, specifically B1 D spade, B2 D club, R1 D heart, and R2 D diamond.
Subjects were told that there would be equal numbers of black and red cards in each
deck, but not exactly how the black cards would subdivide into clubs and spades, nor
how the red cards would subdivide into hearts and diamonds.
A key feature of our design is that we manipulated whether the compositions of
black cards and red cards were mutually dependent or mutually independent. In each
case, the compositions were determined by drawing from a bag containing two types
of balls, the relative proportions of which were unknown to subjects. In our “1-ball”
condition, a single ball was drawn and its type determined the compositions of both
the black cards and the red cards, making those compositions mutually dependent. In
our “2-ball” condition, two balls were drawn with replacement: the first to determine
the composition of the black cards and the second to determine the composition of the
red cards, making the two compositions mutually independent.
Subjects were informed of these procedures and our analysis uses as an identifying
restriction that they believed what they were told. As we explain in Section 3.3, the
information given to subjects implied that the set of possible compositions of the
whole deck corresponded, in the 1-ball condition, to fp1, p4g from Table 2 and, in
10. This issue is also considered by Dimmock et al. (2015), who—like Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015)—
use matching probabilities to test various models, in their case including the ˛-MEU model but not the
smooth ambiguity model.
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TABLE 4. Description of the acts.
Spade Club Heart Diamond
f1 €20 €0 €0 €0
f2 €0 €0 €20 €0
mix Roll die is EVEN: €20
Roll die is ODD: €0
€0 Roll die is EVEN: €20
Roll die is ODD: €0
€0
g1 Roll die is EVEN: €20
Roll die is ODD: €0
Roll die is EVEN: €20
Roll die is ODD: €0
€0 €0
g2 €0 Roll die is EVEN: €20
Roll die is ODD: €0
Roll die is EVEN: €20
Roll die is ODD: €0
€0
the 2-ball condition, to fp1, p2, p3, p4g, with the compositions corresponding to p2
and p3 having equal (but unknown) likelihood. Thus, the 2-ball condition implements
exactly our variant of the Epstein example, explained in Section 2.2. This allows us
to discriminate between the ˛-MEU and smooth ambiguity preference models using
their predictions for that case described earlier. In contrast, because it has no deck
compositions corresponding to p2 and p3, the 1-ball condition provides a control that
eliminates the scope for strict preference for the mixed act over its constituents to
derive from the hedging motive postulated by the smooth ambiguity model. If that
motive is the only driver of strict preference between the mixed act and its constituents
in the 2-ball condition, then—and according to both models of Section 2.1—we would
not observe such strict preference in the 1-ball condition. A different possibility is that
there are other factors—not captured by either model of Section 2.1—that give rise
to strict preference between the mixed act and its constituents in the 1-ball condition.
In this case, we can assess whether the hedging motive postulated by the smooth
ambiguity model contributes to preference over the acts by using our two conditions
alongside each other, with the 1-ball condition controlling for the role of the other
factors.
3.2. Presentation of Acts
Acts were presented to subjects as “gambles”, the outcomes of which would depend,
as just indicated, on the suits of cards drawn from decks. We used two protocols,
one verbal and the other tabular, in different sessions, to describe the acts and the
construction of the decks to subjects. The results proved insignificantly different and,
in Section 4, we pool results from both types of session. Here, we report the tabular
protocol in the main text and indicate how the verbal protocol differed from it in
footnotes.
In the tabular protocol, acts were described by rows in tables—like Table 4—of
which the column headings were suits and the cell entries indicated the results, under
each given act, of a card of each suit being drawn. The cell entries indicated either that
the act would yield €20 in the relevant contingency or that it would yield €0 in that
contingency, or that the outcome in the relevant contingency would depend on a roll
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvz005/5424161 by U
niversity of N
ottingham
 user on 08 April 2019
12 Journal of the European Economic Association
of a (standard 6-sided) die in the following way: €20 if the roll was even and €0 if it
was odd.11 Table 4 has a row corresponding to each of the acts from Table 1. Subjects
never had to consider all these acts at once. Instead, they saw tables like Table 4, but
with only those rows for the acts they were required to consider at a given point (see
below).12
3.3. Decks
Each act was resolved using one of three 10-card decks that subjects were informed
would be constructed after they had completed the experimental tasks. Subjects were
also told that after each deck had been constructed, it would be shuffled and placed
face down in a pile. A 10-sided die would then be rolled and the card “drawn” from
the deck would be the one whose position in the pile matched the number on the die.
These processes were conducted publicly, making it transparent that any card could be
drawn from a given deck and that neither the experimenter nor the subjects’ choices
could influence which one was drawn.
At the start of the experiment, subjects completed tasks relating to two risky acts
that would be resolved using deck 1, which subjects were told would contain 7 spades
and 3 hearts. These risky acts served as a simple introduction to the experiment for
subjects and, as they would be resolved with a deck of known composition, made
it more salient that the remaining acts would be resolved using decks about which
subjects had only limited information. Those decks (decks 2 and 3) are our main focus.
As explained in Section 3.1, our design is premised on an assumption that, in
each condition (i.e., 1-ball or 2-ball), subjects believed certain sets of compositions
of the decks to be those possible. To ground this assumption without compromising
the ambiguity of ambiguous acts or deceiving subjects, we employed a strategy with
three elements: (i) We used a process to construct the relevant decks that allowed us to
control which compositions for each deck were possible in fact; (ii) We told subjects
enough about that process to reveal which compositions were possible but not so much
as to give objective probabilities over the possibilities; and (iii) We conducted the
process publicly at the end of each session.
For each of decks 2 and 3, subjects were told that the deck would consist of 5
black cards and 5 red cards, and, in addition, that the number of spades would be
11. We used the die-rolling procedure as it is easier to perform reliably in the lab than tossing a coin.
With this amendment, suits as contingencies, c D €20 and c D €0, the experimental acts exactly match
their theoretical counterparts in Table 1.
12. In the verbal protocol, each act was described by a single line of text, indicating how the outcome
would depend on the card drawn from a deck. Subjects were told that, depending on the card drawn, each
gamble could have one of three outcomes: WIN, LOSE, or ROLL. WIN and LOSE would yield payments
to the subject of €20 and €0, respectively, whereas ROLL would yield €20 if a standard 6-sided die rolled
at the end of the experiment came up even, and €0 if it came up odd. Each line of text had the following
form: “If you , otherwise you LOSE,” where the first placeholder was filled by either a single
suit (e.g. “Spade”) or a disjunction over two suits (e.g. “Spade or Club”) and the second placeholder by
either WIN or ROLL.
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FIGURE 1. Deck 2 (1-ball condition).
either 4 or 1, with clubs adjusting accordingly, and, similarly, that the number of hearts
would be either 4 or 1, with diamonds adjusting accordingly. What subjects were told
beyond this varied between decks 2 and 3, with the different instructions employing
in different ways an opaque bag containing balls numbered either 1 or 4.
In the 1-ball condition, tasks concerned acts to be resolved using deck 2. Before
completing these tasks, subjects were told that, at the end of the experiment, one ball
would be drawn from the opaque bag. The number on it would give both the number
of spades and the number of hearts in deck 2. Thus, in that deck, the number of spades
and the number of hearts would be identical.
In the 2-ball condition, tasks concerned acts to be resolved using deck 3. Before
completing these tasks, subjects were told that, at the end of the experiment, two balls
would be drawn from the opaque bag, with replacement. The number on the first ball
would give the number of spades in deck 3 and the number on the second ball would
give the number of hearts in deck 3. Thus, in that deck, the number of spades and the
number of hearts would be independent draws.
In each condition, the information just specified was conveyed to subjects by
projection of slides onto the wall of the lab, while the experimenter described the
relevant procedures. The slides for the tabular protocol are as shown in Figures 1
and 2, for the 1-ball and 2-ball conditions, respectively.13
Several features of these procedures are worth stressing. As just explained, in
both conditions, subjects were told that the compositions of decks 2 and 3 would be
determined by drawing the appropriate number of balls from the opaque bag, but they
13. Each suit (the symbol and corresponding word) appeared in its own color, as did the words “black”
and “red”, with other text blue. In the verbal protocol, slides described the compositions in words rather
than pictorially.
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FIGURE 2. Deck 3 (2-ball condition).
were not told anything more than this about the contents of the opaque bag except
that it contained balls of which some were numbered 1 and the others numbered 4.
Since subjects did not know the relative frequency of the types of ball in the bag,
they had no objective probabilities for the possible compositions of either deck 2 or
deck 3. Thus, for acts resolved with these decks, subjects faced genuine ambiguity,
not two-stage objective lotteries. Indeed, the first stage of resolution of uncertainty
(i.e., determination of the composition of decks 2 and 3) was ambiguous in just the
same way as is a draw from an Ellsbergian urn containing specified types of objects in
unspecified proportions.14
As the process determining the outcome of any given ambiguous act was conducted
publicly, subjects were able to verify their limited information about it: balls were drawn
from the opaque bag as described; they were numbered 1 or 4; and each of decks 2
and 3 was constructed to have the composition specified for that deck by the relevant
slide, given the draws from the opaque bag. As long as subjects attended to what they
14. In making explicit mention of a prior stage that determines the probability distribution over payoff-
relevant contingencies, our design departs from the classic Ellsbergian one. It creates an environment
that is closer than the classic Ellsberg case to those considered in many recent applications of ambiguity
frameworks, namely, instances of agents facing model uncertainty, for example, in macroeconomics and
asset pricing (Marinacci 2015). In these applications, model uncertainty is precipitated by a suspected
regime change, leaving the decision maker uncertain about which stochastic data-generating process is
in operation in the immediate/near future. The decision maker is typically considered as having specific
models of that process in mind, but not having reliable probabilistic information as to which of them yields
the “true” distribution.
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were told and realized we would not make statements about procedures that would
be publicly exposed as false later in the session, we are justified in assuming that the
subjects believed that each deck would have one of the compositions we had stated to
be possible for it.
Some authors, such as Charness et al. (2013), conjecture that subjects of previous
experiments may have suspected that devices used to resolve ambiguity might be
stacked against them by the experimenters. Our design is structured so that, as long as
subjects believed information that they would be able to verify, such suspicions would
be minimized, and so that any remaining ones would not undermine our objectives.
Some subjects may have considered the possibility that, when filling the opaque
bag before the session, we might work against their interests but, provided they
remained subjectively uncertain of the content of the opaque bag (e.g., because of
also considering other scenarios about our characters), the required ambiguity would
have remained.15
Although subjects had no information about the relative likelihoods of the two
possible compositions of deck 2, nor about those of the first and fourth possible
compositions of deck 3 (relative either to each other or the other two compositions), the
information given to subjects implied that the second and third possible compositions
of deck 3 were equally likely. (As draws from the opaque bag were with replacement, 1
followed by 4 was precisely as likely as 4 followed by 1.) This is significant in relation to
Section 2.2 as it means that a subject who understood the implications of what they were
told would attach equal weight to possible compositions of deck 3 corresponding to p2
and p3. Of course, we cannot be sure that all subjects appreciated this. Nevertheless,
the information that they were given was entirely symmetric between the second and
third possible compositions of deck 3, so even a subject who did not see that their
information implied an equal likelihood of those compositions would have been given
no grounds for thinking either of them more or less likely than the other. In view of
these points, we start from a maintained hypothesis that subjects did weight the second
and third possible compositions of deck 3 equally, as well as believing the possible
compositions of each deck to be those we had stated to be possible for it. We discuss the
robustness of our conclusions with respect to violations of this maintained hypothesis
in Appendix A.
Finally, the 2-ball condition is not just a device for giving subjects a reason to
put equal weight on the second and third possible compositions of deck 3. It also
implements the key feature of the theoretical framework of Section 2.2 that the
DM understands that the uncertainties about the “B-component” (here, the relative
frequency of spades and clubs) and uncertainties about the “R-component” (here, the
15. Even subjective certainty about the content of the opaque bag would not remove uncertainty about
the compositions of decks 2 and 3, unless subjects were subjectively certain that the opaque bag contained
only one type of ball. We think that unlikely but, in any case, the design builds in an additional fail-safe.
A subject who was subjectively certain that the opaque bag contained only one type of ball would attach
weight only to the deck compositions corresponding to p1, or only to those corresponding to p4. Either way,
they should be indifferent between g1 and g2 in the 2-ball condition and so (see in what follows) would be
coded as ambiguity neutral and, as a result, would not impinge on our comparisons of models.
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relative frequency of hearts and diamonds) are resolved separately. This would not
have been achieved by an (arguably more classically Ellsbergian) design in which the
four possible compositions of deck 3 were simply listed for subjects.
3.4. Elicitation of Preferences
Our procedure for inferring a preference between two acts was to elicit a certainty-
equivalent for each of them and to infer the binary preference from the relative
magnitudes of the certainty-equivalents. This procedure allows incentivized elicitation
of indifference between two acts while avoiding the problems of choice tasks in
which subjects are allowed to express indifference directly.16 To infer a subject’s
certainty-equivalent of a given act, we used a form of choice-list procedure that
yielded interval estimates with a bandwidth of €0.05. The procedure is similar to
that of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), sharing with it the important feature that,
because estimated certainty equivalents are obtained from choices, they should be
unaffected by endowment effects.
In our case, the details of this procedure were as follows. Acts were displayed
to subjects and choice lists completed by them on computers. The experiment was
programed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Each choice list consisted of a table,
each row of which described a choice between an act and a certain sum of money.
Comparing successive rows of a given choice list, the sums of money rose moving
down the table, but the act remained the same.17 In a basic list, the first row was a
choice between the relevant act and €0; the certain sum of money then rose by €1
per row, till the final row was a choice between the act and €20. (See the Online
Appendix for an example basic list.) As, for each act in our design, the two possible
final outcomes were €20 and €0, we obviously expected subjects to choose the act in
some early rows (at least the first one), to switch to the certainty in some subsequent
row, and then to choose the certainty in all the remaining rows. After completing all
rows of a basic choice list to their satisfaction, subjects had to confirm their choices;
the computer would only accept confirmed responses with the single-switch property
just described (or with no switches). After confirmation of their responses to a basic
choice list, a subject who had switched proceeded to a zoomed-in list for the same
act. This had the same structure as the basic one, except that (i) the first and last rows
were, respectively, the two choices where the subject had switched from the act to the
16. If subjects are presented with the choice between two acts and allowed, as a third option, to express
indifference, there would be a problem incentivizing the task. If the third option yields randomization over
the other two then arguably, when it is taken, what would have been revealed is strict preference for the
randomization, rather than indifference between the initial two acts (unless the nature of the randomization
is unknown to subjects—but then there would be a worse confound via an unwanted role for ambiguity
attitude).
17. For support for the use of choice lists rather than attempting to elicit an indifference point directly,
see Cason and Plott (2014); and, for using choice lists where amounts of money, but not the uncertain
option, vary from row to row, see Bosch-Domenech and Silvestre (2013). In respect of the latter point and
in using “zooming-in”, our design parallels the “iterative multiple price lists” of Andersen et al. (2006).
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certainty in the basic list, with the responses to these rows filled in as the subject had
already confirmed them; and (ii) across the intervening rows the certain sums of money
rose in increments of €0.05. Again, the subject was required to choose between the act
and each certain sum, observing the single switch requirement (and could adjust their
responses until they confirmed them). A subject’s certainty-equivalent was coded as
the average of the certain sums in the last row of the zoomed-in list in which she chose
the act and the first row in which she chose the certain sum.
3.5. Incentives
Each subject completed basic lists for ten acts, plus the corresponding zoomed-in lists.
They were told at the start that, after they had completed all choices in all choice
lists, one such choice would be selected at random to be for real18: that is, if they had
chosen the certain sum of money in it, they would receive that sum and, if they had
chosen the act, they would receive the outcome of its resolution.19 This is a form of
the random lottery incentive system, widely used in individual choice experiments. It
prevents confounding income effects between tasks that might arise if more than one
task was paid (likewise, Thaler and Johnson’s (1990) “house money” effects). It is
easy for subjects to understand and, in the current context, allows us to elicit certainty-
equivalents without using cognitively more demanding devices such as auctions or
forms of the Becker–De Groot–Marschak mechanism (Becker et al. 1964) in which
buying or selling “prices” are declared and compared with randomly drawn ones.20
18. The way in which this worked is significant. Subjects were told that the computer would select at
random one row from one basic choice list. If the task in this row was neither the last in which the subject
chose the act nor the first in which she chose the certainty, the subject would receive her choice in the
selected row. Otherwise, the computer would select at random a row from the zoomed-in list defined by
the subject’s choices in the selected basic list, and the subject would receive her choice in that row. This
procedure has the important property that the subject’s choices have no effect on which row of which basic
choice list is selected by the computer at the first stage, and, if the second stage is reached, no effect on
which row of the relevant zoomed-in list is selected. This avoids strategic concerns that would arise if all
choices faced were selected to be for real with equal probability.
19. A card was drawn from each deck at the end of the experiment and a 6-sided die was rolled. Together,
these resolved all chosen acts. All sums due were paid in cash before subjects left the experiment.
20. See Cubitt et al. (1998), Bardsley et al. (2010, Section 6.5), Baltussen et al. (2012), and Azrieli et al.
(2018) for discussions of the random lottery incentive system. If, as hypothesized theoretically by Holt
(1986), Bade (2015), and Baillon et al. (2015), there is a tendency for subjects to see all their task-responses
as steps in the construction of a single portfolio, that could in principle affect responses to individual tasks.
However, it is unclear whether such effects will exist in practice even when there is a theoretical rationale
for one, as subjects may take the cognitively simpler route of considering one task at a time. (A typical
subject in our design faces 400 binary choices across all choice lists, so considering a portfolio of all
responses would be very demanding.) In the context of risky choice, Starmer and Sugden (1991), Beattie
and Loomes (1997), Cubitt et al. (1998), and Hey and Lee (2005) found little evidence of any portfolio
effect even in cases where Holt’s (1986) theoretical argument suggested there “should” be one. In any
case, our design is robust in two further ways. Provided any portfolio effect is the same in the 1-ball and
2-ball conditions, it would not affect the comparison of them. Moreover, as long as the attractiveness of
the mixed act is reduced by background randomization, that would tend to militate against, rather than for,
it. Given this, the direction of any portfolio effect in either condition can be anticipated.
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3.6. Sequence of Tasks
After the choice lists for the risky acts to be resolved with deck 1, subjects completed
choice lists for the ambiguous acts f1, f2, and mix in the 1-ball condition (deck 2),
followed by choice lists for the ambiguous acts f1, f2, mix, g1, and g2 in the 2-ball
condition (deck 3). This progression from a risky environment to environments with
progressively more complex ambiguity provided a natural sequence, conducive to
subjects’ understanding.
Our design was constructed to make it “easy” for subjects to express indifference
between the acts f1, f2, and mix. In each condition, all the basic choice lists for these
three acts were shown and completed side by side on the same screen and subjects
then proceeded to the corresponding zoomed-in lists, again with the lists for the three
acts side by side on the same screen. As subjects could adjust their responses at any
time until they confirmed them, they could easily align (or disalign) their certainty-
equivalents for the acts appearing on the same screen.
After subjects had completed all choice lists for the mixed act and its constituents in
the 1-ball condition and then in the 2-ball condition, they proceeded to a further screen
with the basic choice lists for g1 and g2. They were completed side by side on the same
screen, as were the corresponding zoomed-in lists. As the certainty-equivalents for
these acts would be used to categorize subjects by ambiguity attitude (as we explain
in the next section), we decided to elicit them last to rule out any possibility that
subjects could construct their other choices deliberately to make them consistent with
these ones. Subjects did not see these acts at all until after they had completed all
tasks involving mix and its constituents in the 2-ball condition. The full experimental
instructions are given in the Online Appendix.
3.7. Classification of Subjects
As it was resolved with deck 3, Table 4 and Figure 2 show that g1 offered 5 chances (out
of 10) of a 50–50 die roll under every possible composition of the deck. In contrast,
g2 would yield the die roll if a club or a heart was drawn; and the combined number
of clubs and hearts was uncertain. Specifically, g2 offered 5, 8, 2, and 5 chances (out
of 10), respectively, of the 50–50 die roll under the four possible compositions of
deck 3. As the second and third possible compositions of that deck are equally likely,
ambiguity aversion requires preference for g1 over g2 and ambiguity seeking the reverse
preference. We use this fact to classify subjects by ambiguity attitude. Subjects who
were indifferent between g1 and g2 were classified as ambiguity neutral, and all of the
remainder as ambiguity sensitive, with the latter group divided into ambiguity seeking
and ambiguity averse. Since the predictions in relation to preference over g1 and g2 are
common to the smooth ambiguity and ˛-MEU models, this procedure is in line with
and neutral between both models.
A potential qualification to this procedure is that, strictly, preference over g1 and
g2 only determines a subject’s attitude to ambiguity when the subject weights the
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second and third possible compositions of deck 3 equally. We review the robustness of
our findings to violation of this condition and to other variations on our classification
procedure in Appendix A.
3.8. Predictions and Control
We now put the theoretical predictions in the context of the design. For the 2-ball
condition, which matches the setup of Section 2.2, the smooth ambiguity model predicts
that those subjects who prefer g1 to g2 (ambiguity averse) should also prefer mix to
each of f1 and f2; those who prefer g2 to g1 (ambiguity seekers) should also prefer
each of f1 and f2 to mix; and those who are indifferent between g1 and g2 (ambiguity
neutral) should be indifferent between mix, f1, and f2. In contrast, the ˛-MEU model
predicts that all subjects should be indifferent in the 2-ball condition between mix and
each of its constituents, regardless of their preference over g1 and g2.
We use the 1-ball condition as a control in several related ways. In the 1-
ball condition, the smooth ambiguity model joins the ˛-MEU model in predicting
indifference between f1, f2, and mix as, in each possible composition of deck 2,
the number of spades equals the number of hearts, making the overall chances of
receiving €20 the same under those three acts. If we observe preference for mix
over its constituents among ambiguity-averse subjects in the 2-ball condition, and if
the smooth ambiguity model correctly diagnoses the only source of that preference,
the preference should be absent in the 1-ball condition. However, it is possible that
subjects will be attracted (or repelled) by the mixed act relative to its constituent acts
for reasons other than the hedging argument of the smooth ambiguity model. For
example, subjects might have an attitude, positive or negative, towards the presence
in the resolution of the mixed act of another source of uncertainty, die rolling, in
addition to the drawing of cards from decks. But, if so, this should show up in both
the 2-ball and 1-ball conditions. Thus, the difference between the two conditions is of
particular interest, regardless of whether we observe the predicted indifference in the
1-ball condition.
To build on these points, we now define variables used in our data analysis. We
use CE(f, C) to denote the certainty equivalent of act f in condition C (though we
omit the condition where obvious from the context) and we use AvCE(f, g, C) to
denote the (arithmetic) mean of a subject’s certainty-equivalents for acts f and g
in condition C. The following premium variables can then be defined for each
subject:
Mixed act premium (2-ball) D CE(mix, 2-ball) – AvCE(f1, f2, 2-ball);
Mixed act premium (1-ball) D CE(mix,1-ball) – AvCE(f1, f2, 1-ball);
2-ball premium D CE(mix, 2-ball) – CE(mix, 1-ball);
Difference between mixed act premia D Mixed act premium (2-ball) – Mixed act
premium (1-ball).
“Mixed act premium (2-ball)” measures the excess attractiveness of mix over its
constituents in the condition where the smooth ambiguity model makes its distinctive
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prediction that ambiguity-averse subjects prefer the mixed act and ambiguity seekers
the constituent acts.21 “Mixed act premium (1-ball)” measures the corresponding
excess attractiveness in the condition where both models predict that all three types are
indifferent between mix and its constituents. The variable “difference between mixed
act premia” measures how far “excess attractiveness” of mix over its constituents is
greater in the 2-ball condition than it is in the 1-ball condition. Thus, it measures
the influence of the hedging of independent ambiguities consideration, controlling
for any other factors that (contrary to both models being considered) may make
mix either more or less attractive than its constituent acts in the 1-ball condition.
Finally, the 2-ball premium measures directly the extent to which mix is more
attractive when it does offer a hedge across independent ambiguities than when it
does not.
According to the smooth ambiguity model, all of these premium variables should
be positive for the ambiguity averse, zero for the ambiguity neutral, and negative for
the ambiguity seeking, except for the mixed act premium (1-ball), which should be
zero for all three types. The predictions of the ˛-MEU model are simply that each of
the four premium variables should be zero for all types. Finally, SEU theory implies
ambiguity neutrality and zero values of all four premium variables.22 Thus, three of
the premium variables discriminate between models (for ambiguity-sensitive subjects):
mixed act premium (2-ball), 2-ball premium, and difference between mixed act premia.
The first is a direct comparison of the mixed act and its constituents in the 2-ball
condition; the other two make comparisons across conditions, so exploiting the 1-ball
control. The difference between mixed act premia is our most refined discriminator
between the smooth ambiguity and ˛-MEU models: it measures the contribution of
the hedging of the separately resolving ambiguities motive to preference over mix
and its constituents, while controlling for other motives that might also affect that
preference.
21. Some readers may think it arbitrary to use AvCE(f1, f2, 2-ball) in cases where CE(f1, 2-ball) 6D CE(f2,
2-ball). However, cases where CE(f1, 2-ball) 6D CE(f2, 2-ball) are quite rare and we discuss a theoretically
grounded way of dealing with them in Appendix A. It turns out to make little difference to the results.
22. Except where otherwise stated, we consider subjects categorized as ambiguity averse, ambiguity
seeking, and ambiguity neutral separately when testing predictions for a given premium variable
statistically. This takes account of the fact that when the premium is not predicted to be zero, it is
predicted to differ from zero in a specified (category-dependent) direction for each ambiguity-sensitive
category. In these cases, we test the null hypothesis that the (central tendency of the) premium variable
does not differ from zero (in the predicted direction) against the alternative that it does differ from zero
in the direction predicted by the smooth ambiguity model, using a one-tailed test. In cases where all
the theories we consider predict the premium will be zero, we test a null of no difference from zero
against the alternative that there is such a difference in either direction, using a two-tailed test. For
related tests of relationships between the underlying certainty-equivalents, we adopt the analogous policy:
where the smooth ambiguity model predicts a difference between two certainty-equivalents in a specified
direction, for a given category of subjects, we use a one-tailed test; otherwise we use a two-tailed test.
Though theory mandates one-tailed tests in the cases where we use them, almost all our statistically
significant results in one-tailed tests would also be statistically significant at the 5% level on a two-tailed
test.
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4. Results
4.1. Preliminaries
The experiment was conducted at the University of Tilburg. Ninety-seven subjects took
part, all of whom were students of the university.23 They were paid a show-up fee of
€5 on top of their earnings from the tasks, yielding a total average payment of €15.74.
The main function of the risky acts resolved with deck 1 was to enhance subjects’
understanding of subsequent ones, but we report that the median certainty equivalents
for 70% and 30% chances, respectively, of €20 were €11.73 and €5.58, suggesting
levels of risk aversion not uncommon among experimental subjects. We now turn to
ambiguous acts.
4.2. Results on Classification of Subjects
Certainty equivalents for g1 and g2 allow us to categorize subjects into three types: the
ambiguity averse (CE(g1) > CE(g2)); the ambiguity neutral (CE(g1) D CE(g2)); and
the ambiguity seeking (CE(g1) < CE(g2)). Out of a total of 97, the numbers of subjects
of each type were 31, 50, and 16, respectively.
Although some studies have found a higher proportion of ambiguity-sensitive
subjects than we do, Ahn et al. (2014, p. 206) found that 72.7% of their subjects were
either ambiguity neutral or close to it and Charness et al. (2013, p. 3) found 60.3% of
theirs to be ambiguity neutral. Thus, our findings are not out of line with the range of
previous findings. Recall that our design was constructed to make it “easy” to reveal
indifference between certain sets of acts the certainty equivalents of which were elicited
side by side on the same screen. A subject who saw a relationship between two such
acts that she regarded as making them equally attractive would have had no difficulty
in giving certainty-equivalents that reflected that judgment. From this perspective, the
proportion of subjects coded as ambiguity neutral is actually quite encouraging, even
though it lowers the proportion coded as ambiguity sensitive. As subjects clearly were
able to express indifference between g1 and g2, there is no reason to think they would
not have been able to do so between mix and its constituents (the certainty equivalents
of which were also elicited side by side on the same screen) if they saw fit.24
Notwithstanding ambiguity neutral being the largest group, the mean difference
CE(g1)  CE(g2) was €0.45 across all subjects, reflecting some ambiguity aversion on
average. The corresponding figures for the two ambiguity-sensitive types were €1.90
for the ambiguity averse and –€0.93 for the ambiguity seeking.
23. We exclude from these figures and our data analysis five subjects who always chose the same option
in at least one choice list, so revealing misunderstanding by violating dominance.
24. In further support of this out of 97 subjects, 71 gave identical certainty equivalents for f1 and f2 in
the 2-ball condition, in line with theoretical predictions. (The others are considered in Appendix A.1.)
For comparison, the only case we have where all theories would predict a difference between certainty
equivalents is that of the two risky acts; here, just 7 subjects gave identical certainty-equivalents.
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FIGURE 3. Mean CEs for ambiguity-seeking, ambiguity-neutral, and ambiguity-averse subjects.
TABLE 5. Premia (in €, rounded to nearest cent).
Ambiguity seeking
(n D 16)
Ambiguity neutral
(n D 50)
Ambiguity averse
(n D 31)
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Premia
Mixed act (2-ball) 0.30 0.46 2.68 0.29 0.00 1.58 1.06 0.73 2.63
Mixed act (1-ball) 0.69 0.00 2.53 0.09 0.00 2.02 0.12 0.00 2.39
2-ball 0.60 0.43 1.85 0.58 0.00 2.13 0.83 0.55 2.53
Difference between
mixed act premia
0.39 0.64 2.01 0.21 0.00 2.00 0.95 0.30 2.39
4.3. Comparing Certainty Equivalents: Central Tendencies
As an initial display of our findings, Figure 3 reports the mean certainty equivalents,
for each ambiguous act under each condition, separately by type of subject.
As explained in Section 3.8, the most important features of our data are the premium
variables defined in terms of the certainty equivalents. The mean, median, and standard
deviations (SDs) of each of the four premium variables are reported Table 5.25
Several points stand out from Figure 3 and Table 5. If, first, we confine attention to
subjects coded as ambiguity averse, then the findings are, at eyeball level, very much in
line with the predictions of the smooth ambiguity model. In particular, the right-hand
panel of Figure 3 shows that, for these subjects, mix seems to have been judged on
average to be notably more attractive than its constituents in the 2-ball condition, but
not in the 1-ball condition. Table 5 indicates that, for the ambiguity averse, the mixed
25. Among the ambiguity seeking, the median difference between mixed act premia is negative, though
the median mixed act premium (2-ball) is positive and the median mixed act premium (1-ball) is zero. This
is not a typo, but just a sharper reflection of the fact, also evident for the ambiguity averse, that median
(x-y) may not equal (median x)  (median y).
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act premium (2-ball) and the 2-ball premium are both, on average and by median,
positive and seemingly nontrivial, whereas the central tendencies of the mixed act
premium (1-ball) are close to zero.26
For ambiguity-averse subjects, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests reveal that CE(mix, 2-
ball) exceeds each of CE(f1, 2-ball) and CE(f2, 2-ball) (p D 0.006 and p D 0.008,
respectively) and also that CE(mix, 2-ball) is larger than CE(mix, 1-ball) (p D 0.035).
In contrast, we cannot reject equality of CE(mix, 1-ball) with either CE(f1, 1-ball) or
CE(f2, 1-ball) (p D 0.664 and p D 0.635, respectively). Thus, there is evidence, at the
level of central tendencies, in favor of the hypothesis that ambiguity-averse subjects
value the hedge against independent ambiguities that mix offers over its constituents
in the 2-ball condition but that, as also predicted by the smooth ambiguity model,
this attraction to mix disappears in the 1-ball condition, where the ambiguities are not
independent.
In the case of subjects coded as ambiguity neutral, all theories agree. The medians
of each of the premium variables are exactly as predicted by the theories. However,
surprisingly, ambiguity-neutral subjects seem from Figure 3 to prefer each of the acts
in the 1-ball condition over the same act in the 2-ball condition, as Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests confirm.27 The reason for this is unclear but, one possibility is that some
subjects are averse to greater numbers of possible compositions of the deck. Whatever
the reason, as the effect favors the 1-ball version, it does not seem to indicate any
factor that would contribute to our earlier finding that ambiguity-averse subjects prefer
the 2-ball version of mix over its constituents. Indeed, if anything, it strengthens that
finding.
Our findings for subjects coded as ambiguity seeking are more mixed than those
for the ambiguity averse. For example, for these subjects, the mean and median values
of the mixed act premium (2-ball) both have the wrong sign from the perspective of the
smooth ambiguity model. However, the picture changes if we consider the premium
variables that use the 1-ball control. The means and medians of the 2-ball premium
and the difference between mixed act premia all take the sign predicted by the smooth
model. That said, these effects receive only very limited corroboration in statistical
tests,28 so we cannot reject the predictions of the ˛-MEU model for ambiguity-seeking
subjects. Given the small number of such subjects, it would inevitably be difficult to
detect any statistically reliable pattern in their behavior.
However, ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-seeking categories can be pooled, using
transformations of the three premium variables that discriminate between models
in predictions for ambiguity-sensitive subjects. For each of these variables, the
26. In interpreting the median values in Table 5, recall that our design makes it easy to reveal certain
indifferences and that we only have interval estimates of certainty equivalents, so median values of precisely
zero are less surprising than they might otherwise seem.
27. p-values for rejection of null hypotheses CE(mix, 1-ball) D CE(mix, 2-ball), CE(f1, 2-ball) D CE(f1,
1-ball), and CE(f2, 2-ball) D CE(f2, 1-ball) are, respectively, 0.029, 0.010, and 0.001.
28. Statistically, CE(mix, 2-ball) is not significantly smaller than either CE(f1, 2-ball) or CE(f2, 2-ball)(p D 0.226 and p D 0.121, respectively). The difference between CE(mix, 2-ball) and CE(mix, 1-ball) is
only marginally significant even on the appropriate one-sided test (p D 0.085); and the difference between
mixed act premia is not (p D 0.243).
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TABLE 6. “Signs” of premia and ambiguity attitude.
CE(g1)  CE(g2)
Ambiguity attitude
<0 (Seeking) 0 (Neutral) >0 (Averse)
Mixed act premium
(2-ball)
>0 9 13 21
0 1 26 3
<0 6 11 7
2-ball premium >0 4 (4) 12 (7) 19 (17)
0 0 (4) 15 (23) 2 (6)
<0 12 (8) 23 (20) 10 (8)
Difference between
mixed act premia
>0 5 (5) 16 (16) 19 (17)
0 1 (1) 19 (21) 4 (7)
<0 10 (10) 15 (13) 8 (7)
transformation makes deviations from zero in the direction predicted by the smooth
ambiguity model positive, and deviations in the opposite direction negative, by
multiplying the original premium variable by 1 for the ambiguity seeking (only).
Then, the smooth model predicts a positive value of the transformed variable for any
ambiguity-sensitive subject, whereas the ˛-MEU model predicts a zero value, and
a negative value is possible but not predicted by either model. This transformation
allows statistical tests to be conducted on the n D 47 ambiguity-sensitive subjects
taken as a single group. We find that the transformed mixed act premium (2-ball) is
only marginally significantly larger than zero (p D 0.061), but the transformed 2-ball
premium and transformed difference in mixed act premia are both significantly larger
than zero (p D 0.013 and p D 0.012, respectively), so that, again, exploiting the 1-ball
control sharpens the picture.
4.4. Categorical Analysis
The analysis of the previous subsection is subject to two limitations. First, it
concentrates on magnitudes of certainty equivalents and premium variables, whereas
the theoretical predictions are really about ordinal comparisons of certainty equivalents
(and hence only about signs of the premium variables). Secondly, as it focuses on the
“typical” subject in each type, it does not fully capture the proportion of subjects in
a given type conforming to a given prediction. In this subsection, we present a brief
categorical analysis that addresses these points.
We define (with slight abuse of terminology) the sign of a variable as taking one of
three values: strictly positive, zero, or strictly negative. Table 6 presents contingency
tables for the sign of CE(g1)  CE(g2) (i.e., the subject’s type) against the sign of each
of the three premium variables that discriminate between models. The table gives the
frequencies of subjects with each combination of type and sign of premium variable,
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TABLE 7. Sign-matching and sign-zero rates (%) by premium variable.
Premium variable Rate: Sign-. . .
All
(n D 97)
Ambiguity
sensitive (n D 47)
Ambiguity
averse (n D 31)
Mixed act (2-ball) Matching 55 57 68
Zero 31 9 10
2-ball Matching 47 (49) 66 (53) 61 (55)
Zero 18 (34) 4 (21) 6 (19)
Difference between Matching 49 (49) 62 (57) 61 (55)
mixed act premia Zero 25 (30) 11 (17) 13 (23)
for each premium variable. The first number in each cell gives the absolute number,
for each frequency.
As it may be difficult for a subject to achieve a value of precisely zero for a given
premium variable, we also consider an alternative coding. We have already argued
that subjects seemed to have no difficulty in achieving CE(g1) D CE(g2), as these two
certainty equivalents were elicited side by side on the same screen. For this reason,
we use a requirement of exact equality here when classifying subjects as ambiguity
neutral. But, that argument is less compelling for some of the premia. To achieve either
a 2-ball premium of zero or a difference between mixed act premia of zero requires
suitable alignment of certainty-equivalents elicited across different screens. In view of
these points, Table 6 also indicates parenthetically, for these variables, the frequencies
under a revised coding scheme in which a sign of zero is attributed to the premium
variable if its absolute value is no more than €0.20 from zero (an allowance equivalent
to four rows of a zoomed-in choice -list). Unsurprisingly, this pulls more observations
into the central rows of the relevant panels of Table 6.
According to the smooth ambiguity model, each subject’s type should match the
sign of their premium variable, for each of the three premium variables presented in
Table 6. To capture the extent of conformity with this prediction, we calculate, for
each of these premium variables, the sign-matching rate, defined as the percentage of
subjects for whom the type matches the sign of the premium variable. Correspondingly,
for each premium variable, we also calculate the sign-zero rate, defined as the
percentage of subjects for whom the sign of the premium variable is coded as 0,
in accordance with the ˛-MEU model.
Table 7 reports both rates, for each of the premium variables from Table 6,
separately for all subjects, ambiguity-sensitive subjects, and ambiguity-averse subjects.
Rates are given to the nearest percentage. As with Table 6, unparenthesized entries
correspond to the stricter coding rule for a zero sign on the premium variable and
parenthesized entries to the looser coding. By construction, the looser coding rule for a
sign of zero on the premium variable cannot lower the sign-zero rate. In fact, as Table 7
shows, it raises that rate in all cases and in some cases substantially so. In contrast, the
looser coding rule sometimes raises and sometimes lowers the sign-matching rate, and
most of these adjustments are quite small. In terms of the comparative performance of
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the smooth ambiguity and ˛-MEU models for a given premium variable and group of
subjects, what matters is the difference between the sign-matching and the sign-zero
rate. This is reduced by the looser coding rule for the latter rate in all cases shown.
Using the looser of our codings where applicable, the sign-matching rate exceeds
the sign-zero rate in every case reported in Table 7, by a margin never lower than 15
percentage points. If attention is restricted to ambiguity-sensitive subjects, then, using
the coding that favors the sign-zero rate in the second and third cases, the sign-matching
rate exceeds it by 48 (D 57–9) percentage points, 32 (D 5321) percentage points,
and 40 (D 57–17) percentage points for the mixed-act premium (2-ball), the 2-ball
premium, and the difference between mixed act premia, respectively. In this respect,
the smooth ambiguity model outperforms the ˛-MEU model.
That said, the performance of the smooth ambiguity model in Table 7 is far from
perfect. The sign-matching rates reported in the “All” column are only around 50%,
and none of those reported in other columns exceed 68%. (These figures compare with
a benchmark of 33%, if the three values of sign were allocated at random.)
4.5. Main Experiment: Summary of Findings
The analysis of central tendencies reported in Section 4.3 and the individual-level
categorical analysis of Section 4.4 broadly cohere with one another.
Where the smooth ambiguity and ˛-MEU models agree in relation to our design—
that is, in their predictions for the ambiguity neutral in the 2-ball condition and for
all types in the 1-ball condition—their shared predictions perform well, as judged by
central tendencies, but less well at the individual level. For example, the median value
of each of our premium variables is zero in every case where both models predict that
it will be zero, but neither model accounts for the fairly frequent incidence (evidenced
by the central data column of Table 6) of individual-level violations of the shared
prediction that each premium variable will be zero for each ambiguity-neutral subject.
Our potential for discriminating between models is provided by ambiguity-
sensitive subjects, be they ambiguity averse or ambiguity seeking, since the two
models disagree in their predictions for these subjects. Too few subjects are coded
as ambiguity seeking for a statistically significant pattern to emerge when that group is
considered on its own but when all ambiguity-sensitive subjects are pooled, the three
premium variables that distinguish between models tell broadly in favor of the smooth
ambiguity model. This generalization holds for individual-level analysis and central
tendencies alike, but the evidence for it is less clear for the premium variable that only
draws information from the 2-ball condition than it is for the two premium variables
that exploit our 1-ball control by drawing information from both conditions. This
qualification suggests that neither model fully captures the behaviour of the whole set
of ambiguity-sensitive subjects in either condition taken separately, yet comparison of
the 2-ball and 1-ball conditions is still broadly consistent with responses to separately
resolving ambiguities in directions predicted by the smooth ambiguity model.
The qualification about reliance on measures that exploit the 1-ball control is not
needed when attention is restricted to subjects coded as ambiguity averse as, for these
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subjects, all of the three premium variables that discriminate between models tell
essentially the same story in both forms of analysis. We find clear and statistically
significant patterns in the behavior of the subjects coded as ambiguity averse that
conform more closely to the predictions of the smooth ambiguity model than to those
of the ˛-MEU model.
5. Extensions
Before concluding, we comment on some extensions of our investigations reported in
this section and, especially, in Appendices A to C.
5.1. Robustness to Categorization
As noted in Section 3.7, our categorization of subjects by ambiguity attitude assumes
that they see the second and third compositions of deck 3 as equally likely, as
implied by the information provided. It also assumes that, even when they have this
belief, they reveal ambiguity neutrality through exact equality between CE(g1) and
CE(g2). Appendix A explores the robustness of our conclusions to relaxation of these
assumptions: Appendix A.1 considers the possibility of subjects not realizing that the
second and third compositions of deck 3 are equally likely and Appendix A.2 what
happens if we allow closeness (rather than only equality) between CE(g1) and CE(g2)
to count as indicating ambiguity neutrality. In each case, the details of our findings are
affected but the general tenor is not.
A different possible concern about our analysis, in view of the findings of previous
experiments in the literature, is its reliance on expected utility theory as the model
of choice under objective risk. In this respect, our analysis is true to the smooth and
˛-MEU models, as usually formulated.29 Notwithstanding this, in Appendix B, we
show that our theoretical analysis would be robust to a reformulation of these models
in which expected utility theory is replaced in this role by any one of a range of
nonexpected utility models.
5.2. Divide Across Models: Theory and a Follow-up Experiment
In Appendix C, we substantiate the assertion of Section 1 that the ˛-MEU and
smooth ambiguity models stand as examples of broader classes of models of
ambiguity-sensitive preference: that is, respectively, of models of preferences whose
representations focus exclusively on minimum and/or maximum expected utilities and
of models whose representations also give weight to nonextremal expected utilities. In
particular, we identify other models that, under important but plausible assumptions,
29. Dean and Ortoleva (2017) introduce a model with close affinity to the MEU model that also captures
violations of expected utility theory under objective risk, such as the Allais paradoxes, and explores the
links between hedging, Ellsberg-like, and Allais-like behavior.
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share the predictions of models that we have considered in the main text in the context
of our design.
In the case of the main study reported above, one model—that of Seo (2009)—
shares the predictions of KMM’s smooth ambiguity model in a particularly direct way.
But, as footnote 7 explains, the two models differ in subtle respects, in particular in
tying or not tying ambiguity aversion to violation of ROCL. This issue connects to
an important debate in the ambiguity literature about whether sensitivity towards
ambiguity is simply the result of nonstandard reduction of compound lotteries.
The experimental data of Halevy (2007) suggest that this is the case:30 ambiguity
aversion is strongly associated with violations of ROCL. Abdellaoui et al. (2015),
however, observe that ambiguity-neutral subjects also often violate ROCL and that
a significant proportion of subjects who do reduce compound lotteries are sensitive
towards ambiguity, suggesting that ambiguity attitude is more than DMs violating
ROCL.
In view of these points, we ran an additional experiment with two-stage objective
lotteries in place of the ambiguous acts of the main study. In this follow-up study, the
objective probabilities of the possible compositions of decks 2 and 3 respectively were
given to subjects. Specifically, the opaque bag that determined the composition of deck
2 and deck 3 was publicly filled with an equal number of balls numbered 1 and 4, so that
subjects knew that each possible composition of deck 2 was equally likely, as was each
possible composition of deck 3. In all other respects, the new treatment was identical
to the main experiment.31 Since the probabilities for each possible composition are
objectively given, in the new experiment the behavior implied by MEU and KMM’s
model are identical and consistent with that implied by expected utility. As noted in
footnote 7, in Seo’s (2009) model, violation of ROCL is implied by a concave ' and
unaffected by whether the second-order uncertainty is an objective risk or not.
In total, 86 undergraduate students (average payment €15.24) from Tilburg
University participated.32 Classifying subjects based on the difference between the
certainty-equivalent of acts g1 and g2 yields the same general pattern of preferences
as in the main experiment. In particular, 20 subjects reported CE(g1) > CE(g2), 16
reported CE(g1) < CE(g2), and 50 reported CE(g1) D CE(g2). As all risks are objective
in the follow-up experiment, the two strict inequalities are violations of ROCL and, in
that sense, contrary to KMM’s model and MEU. A two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test
does not reveal a statistically significant difference between the two experiments in the
statistic CE(g1)  CE(g2) (p D 0.236). These findings are in line with the Seo (2009)
model and also suggestive of the findings of Halevy (2007).
Just as with the main experiment, it is particularly interesting to consider the
preferences over mix and its constituents of subjects appearing to be “ambiguity
30. See also Chew et al. (2017).
31. We used the tabular protocol. Instructions for the follow-up experiment are in the Online Appendix.
32. The data of 4 subjects who always chose the same option in at least one choice list was removed
from the analysis.
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averse”, in the sense that (CE(g1) > CE(g2)).33 But, here the picture is mixed, in
part depending on whether the 1-ball control is used. For subjects with CE(g1) >
CE(g2) in the follow-up experiment, one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests provide
some evidence that mix is preferred to its constituents, as CE(mix, 2-ball) exceeds
each of CE(f1, 2-ball) and CE(f2, 2-ball) (p D 0.063 and p D 0.039, respectively).
However, this evidence disappears when measures exploiting the 1-ball control are
used. In particular, the 2-ball premium is not significantly positive (p D 0.383) and
nor is the difference between mixed act premia (p D 0.470). Recall in contrast that,
in the main experiment, all premium variables told the same story for the ambiguity
averse. This difference between the findings of the two experiments is more supportive
of KMM’s version of the smooth model than of that of Seo (2009).
Moreover, in the follow-up experiment, a Friedman test does not detect differences
between the distributions of the ranks of the certainty equivalents of the acts f1, f2,
and mix in the 1-ball condition, f1, f2, and mix in the 2-ball condition, and g1 and
g2 in the 2-ball condition (p D 0.658). In contrast, a similar Friedman test for the
main experiment reveals that the ranks of those certainty equivalents are different
(p D 0.012). These findings suggest that the aggregate pattern of preference over these
acts that we observe in the main experiment is not entirely driven by violations of
ROCL in preferences over objective lotteries. However, two qualifications are in order.
First, we do observe many violations of ROCL at the individual level in the follow-up
experiment, so its findings do not in themselves support ROCL for objective risks.
Secondly, as the follow-up study was run later than the main one, subjects were not
randomly assigned between the two; so, any comparison of the studies must be made
with caution. Partly for this reason, we focus on the main study in our final concluding
comments.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have presented an experiment designed to discriminate empirically between two
well-known and widely applied models of ambiguity attitude—the ˛-MEU and smooth
ambiguity models—which stand as representatives of a broader theoretical divide. This
is important as the conclusions of existing applied economic models that incorporate
ambiguity are often derived from specific models of ambiguity sensitivity, sometimes
on one side of the divide we mark and sometimes on the other.
Our strategy for distinguishing between models focuses on whether or not an
agent’s preference for hedging separate ambiguities depends on ambiguity attitude.
Interpreting our findings narrowly in terms of a comparison of the smooth ambiguity
and ˛-MEU models, we find that, although neither model captures all aspects of our
33. It is necessary, in Seo’s model, for ' to be concave for CE(g1) > CE(g2). Therefore, in Seo’s model,
subjects with CE(g1) > CE(g2) will prefer mix to its constituent acts in the 2-ball condition, but not in the
1-ball condition.
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data, there are striking features of the data that conform more closely to the smooth
ambiguity model than to the ˛-MEU model. As explained in Section 1 and Appendix
C, this discrimination extends to a broader divide between models that do or do not
give weight to nonextreme expected utilities, among those considered possible.
Finally, our results provide a more general reassurance to the theories of ambiguity
aversion. It has long been argued, at a theoretical level, that reliance on stochastic
mixing as a way to hedge ambiguity is a defining part of a rational response to
ambiguity. Indeed, such is the motivating basis of Schmeidler’s (1989) Uncertainty
Aversion axiom, which lies at the heart of ambiguity-averse preference models, quite
generally (Cerreia-Vioglio et al. 2011). However, the best-known prior study that we
are aware of which investigates the link between ambiguity aversion and preference
for randomization—Dominiak and Schnedler (2011)—reports little support for this
central premise of theories of ambiguity aversion. In view of this, it is particularly
notable that our main finding, specifically strict preference for mix over f1 and f2 on the
part of the ambiguity averse in the 2-ball condition, supports the Uncertainty Aversion
axiom.34 Hence, a further overall takeaway from our findings is that they provide
evidence for a link between ambiguity aversion and propensity to use randomization
to hedge ambiguity, and thus for the central foundational principle of theories of
ambiguity aversion, quite generally.
Appendix A: Robustness to Classification
In this appendix, we consider the robustness of our findings to variations in our
procedure for classifying subjects by ambiguity attitude, as explained in Section 5.
A.1. Robustness Towards Beliefs
As explained in Section 3.7, our classification of subjects as ambiguity averse,
ambiguity neutral, or ambiguity seeking used a procedure that, strictly, relies on
subjects being indifferent, in the 2-ball condition, between f1 and f2. In fact, for 71
34. Consider ambiguity-averse DMs. An ˛-MEU preference and a smooth ambiguity preference both
satisfy Schmeidler’s Uncertainty Aversion axiom. The axiom requires that there will be instances when,
given two acts between which the DM is indifferent, the mixture between the acts is strictly preferred
to either act, delineating the characteristic departure of ambiguity aversion from behavior satisfying the
(Anscombe and Aumann) SEU theory. However, the axiom does not further stipulate what those instances
will be. Our acts mix, f1, and f2 in the 2-ball condition provide an instance where a smooth ambiguity model
implies a strict preference whereas an ˛-MEU model predicts indifference. (In contrast, both models
predict strict preference for the mixture of two bets, one on each color of an Ellsberg 2-color ambiguous
urn, over its constituents.) Hence, had we found that subjects coded as ambiguity averse were largely
indifferent between our three acts in the 2-ball condition then that would be evidence neither in support of
nor against Schmeidler’s axiom, whereas the strict preference that we do find is positive support for the
axiom. In our design, in line with the axiom, the objective randomization that mix offers is conducted as
a final step in determining the outcome of the act. In contrast, in Dominiak and Schnedler’s design, the
objective randomization is ex-ante.
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subjects, the condition CE(f1, 2-ball) D CE(f2, 2-ball) holds exactly. For the remaining
26 subjects, the statistic CE(g1)  CE(g2) is well defined, but no longer sufficient
to identify a subject’s ambiguity attitude, as the subjects do not appear to weight
the second and third possible compositions of deck 3 equally. In this appendix,
we comment on how that affects our analysis, in particular, the robustness of our
conclusions regarding the comparison of models.
For purposes of this discussion, we fix the domain of preferences to include those
described by:
1. an ˛-MEU model with the set of probabilities in the representation given by
P D fpi | i D 1, . . . , 4g, or its convex hull, where pi refers to the probabilities
described in Table 2;
2. an SEU model (specifically, an Anscombe–Aumann model) that puts positive weight
on each of the four probabilities, pi, i D 1, . . . , 4;
3. a smooth ambiguity model with a nonlinear ' and a  that puts positive weight on
each of the four probabilities, pi, i D 1, . . . , 4.
Within this domain, the ˛-MEU model predicts indifference between f1 and f2 and
mix regardless of preference over g1 and g2. In contrast, both the smooth ambiguity
and SEU models allow nonindifference between f1 and f2 if p2 and p3 are weighted
unequally.35 Importantly, they also require that the directions of a subject’s preference
over g1 and g2 and her preference over mix and f2 match, as can seen from an inspection
of the relevant rows of Table 3. However, SEU imposes an additional restriction that
the smooth model does not, namely, that the direction of preference between f1 and
f2 must also match that between g1 and g2. Under the smooth ambiguity model,
nonlinearity of ' could upset this correspondence, thereby distinguishing SEU from
smooth ambiguity. In fact, of the 26 subjects who are not indifferent between f1 and f2
in the 2-ball condition, only 5 conform to the additional restriction imposed by SEU.
Thus, if we set SEU aside and focus on the two models of ambiguity sensitivity,
we may use a comparison of the preferences between mix and f2 and between g1
and g2 as a means of discriminating between the models, even when the subject is
not indifferent between f1 and f2. Hence, our strategy for comparing the ˛-MEU and
smooth ambiguity models is a simple modification of our analysis in the main part
of the paper. We replace AvCE(f1, f2, 2-ball) with CE(f2, 2-ball) in the definitions of
mixed act premium (2-ball) and difference between mixed act premia. For a given sign
of CE(g1)–CE(g2), the predictions of the smooth ambiguity model for the signs of the
two redefined premium variables are exactly the same as for the original definitions.
Similarly, for the ˛-MEU model, the implications for the signs of the two redefined
premium variables are exactly as for the original definitions, since the model predicts
35. Allowing this possibility involves relaxing our maintained hypothesis that subjects understand the
implications of their information, but is consistent with continuing to assume that they believe what they
are told directly.
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indifference between mix and f2 for any value of CE(g1)  CE(g2). These points are
unaffected by whether CE(g1)  CE(g2) indicates ambiguity attitude.
The redefinition can only affect subjects for whom CE(f1, 2-ball) 6D CE(f2, 2-ball).
(These subjects are spread roughly evenly across the three categories by the sign of
CE(g1)  CE(g2).) The sign of the mixed act premium (2-ball) is changed by the
redefinition in only nine cases and the sign of the difference between mixed act premia
in only three. Clearly, the latter point makes little difference, so we focus on the former,
using the stricter coding rule for a zero sign on a premium, because the redefinition
of the mixed act premium (2-ball) makes it the difference of two certainty-equivalents
elicited next to each other. For the mixed act premium (2-ball), the number of subjects
with a zero sign rises from 30 to 35, whereas the number with a sign matching that of
CE(g1)  CE(g2) falls from 53 to 51. Though this impact of the redefinition slightly
favors the ˛-MEU model, the sign-matching rate for all subjects still exceeds the sign-
zero rate by more than 16 percentage points. Thus, the main qualitative conclusions
of the categorical analysis (Section 4.4) are not affected. Moving beyond signs, the
median mixed act premium (2-ball) rises by 2 (resp. 0) euro cents among subjects with
CE(g1)  CE(g2) > (resp. D ) 0. Hence, for these subjects the modification makes very
little difference to the central tendency. But, among those with CE(g1)  CE(g2) < 0,
the median mixed act premium (2-ball) rises from €0.46 to €0.85. This is a movement
in the wrong direction for both the smooth and ˛-MEU models. In that sense, it does
not affect the conclusions that we drew from our analysis of the central tendencies of
certainty-equivalents in Section 4.3, about the relative performance of those models.
A.2. Robustness to Trembles
In Section 4, we used exact equality of CE(g1) and CE(g2) to classify subjects based on
their attitude towards ambiguity, because these certainty equivalents were presented
to subjects side by side on the same screen. Here we consider whether our results
are robust if we apply looser coding rules to classify subjects in terms of ambiguity
attitude. In particular, we distinguish between three coding rules for monetary sums.
Under strict coding (S), a variable of interest has to be exactly zero in order to be
counted as zero, whereas under Tremble-Tolerant (TT) coding, the variable of interest
has to be no more than C0.05 and no less than 0.05, and under Loose (L) coding,
it has to be no more than C0.20 and no less than 0.20. In terms of choice behavior,
these codings translate respectively into no margin of error in a zoomed-in choice-list
(S), a margin of error equivalent to one row of a zoomed-in choice list (TT), and a
margin of error equivalent to four rows of a zoomed-in choice list (L), respectively.
Tables A.1 and A.2 replicate the results reported in Table 5, using Tremble-
Tolerant and Loose coding, respectively, when classifying subjects by attitude towards
ambiguity, rather than the Strict coding used in Table 5. By construction, applying a
looser coding to type classification reduces the number of ambiguity-sensitive subjects,
specifically in our case, from 47 under Strict coding (Table 5) to 39 under Tremble-
Tolerant coding (Table A.1) and 36 under Loose coding (Table A.2). We have already
defended Strict coding for use in identifying ambiguity neutrality, on the grounds that
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TABLE A.1. Premia (in €, rounded to nearest cent) with Tremble Tolerant coding.
Ambiguity seeking
(n D 11)
Ambiguity neutral
(n D 58)
Ambiguity averse
(n D 28)
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Premia
Mixed act (2-ball) 0.89 1.05 2.69 0.24 0.00 1.66 1.03 0.69 2.77
Mixed act (1-ball) 0.97 0.00 2.98 0.10 0.00 1.95 0.07 0.13 2.43
2-ball 0.20 0.05 1.57 0.59 0.02 2.12 0.84 0.53 2.63
Difference between
mixed act premia
 0.09  0.70 1.65 0.13 0.00 2.06 0.95 0.29 2.46
TABLE A.2. Premia (in €, rounded to nearest cent) with Loose coding.
Ambiguity seeking
(n D 11)
Ambiguity neutral
(n D 61)
Ambiguity averse
(n D 25)
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Premia
Mixed act (2-ball) 0.89 1.05 2.69 0.36 0.00 1.73 0.82 0.50 2.84
Mixed act (1-ball) 0.97 0.00 2.98 0.05 0.00 2.00 0.19 0.25 2.39
2-ball 0.20 0.05 1.57 0.45 0.00 2.18 0.66 0.10 2.70
Difference between
mixed act premia
0.09 0.70 1.65 0.31 0.00 2.19 0.63 0.15 2.33
CE(g1) and CE(g2) are elicited right next to each other on the same screen. In view of
this point, we also see Tremble-Tolerant as the more plausible of the two alternative
coding rules for ambiguity attitude. But, we include both for completeness.
Our main findings regarding ambiguity-averse subjects replicate under the
Tremble-Tolerant coding, despite the lower number of observations.36 First, the
central tendencies of the premium variables are hardly affected by switching from
Strict to Tremble-Tolerant coding. Moreover, the mixed act premium (2-ball) is again
significantly positive (p D 0.019), whereas the mixed act premium (1-ball) is not
(p D 0.328). The difference between these premia is also significantly positive (p D
0.044). Although, under Loose coding, the mixed act premium (2-ball) and mixed-act
premium (1-ball) are lower than those under tighter codings and neither is significantly
different from zero, this may in part be due to low power and, in any case, we see
the Tremble-Tolerant coding as more plausible for classification of subjects by type of
ambiguity attitude. Nevertheless, the reader may be surprised that reducing the number
of subjects coded as ambiguity averse, by adopting Loose rather than Strict coding for
ambiguity neutrality, lowers the mean and median of the key premium variables for
ambiguity-averse subjects. It is important to note, however, that the predictions of the
36. We do not pursue statistical comparisons for ambiguity-seeking subjects under the looser codings as
there are only eleven such subjects.
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TABLE A.3. Sign-matching rate minus sign-zero rate (%) for ambiguity-sensitive subjects: different
codings.
Codinga
Strict–Strict Strict–Loose TT–Loose Loose–Loose
(n D 47) (n D 47) (n D 39) (n D 36)
Mixed act premium (2-ball) 49 38 31 25
2-ball premium 62 32 31 25
Difference between mixed act premia 51 40 36 31
Notes: a. Strict–Strict refers to Strict coding of types and signs of premia; Strict–Loose refers to Strict coding
of types and Loose coding of signs of premia; TT–Loose refers to Tremble Tolerant coding of types and Loose
coding of signs of premia; Loose–Loose refers to Loose coding of types and signs of premia. Cell entries are
rounded to the nearest integer.
smooth ambiguity model for these variables are only ordinal. In particular, the model
does not require that the larger is CE(g1)  CE(g2) the larger will be the premium
variables predicted to be positive for the ambiguity averse. Instead, the predictions are
about signs.
In view of this, we turn to the robustness of our categorical analysis. For this,
we need to consider combinations of coding rules, as we must code both the type
of ambiguity attitude and the sign of the premium. So, for brevity, we focus—for
each premium variable analyzed in Section 4.4—on the robustness of our findings to
different coding rule combinations of one measure of the comparative performance of
the smooth ambiguity and ˛-MEU models, namely, the excess of the sign-matching
rate over the sign-zero rate for ambiguity-sensitive subjects. Table A.3 reports this
statistic for each premium variable considered in Section 4.4, for four different coding
combinations.37 The label at the top of each column gives the coding combination
that column reports, with the first word of the label giving the coding rule applied
to ambiguity neutrality in the classification by type and the second word the coding
rule applied in coding the sign of the premium. The third and fourth columns report
new codings, not considered in the main text, whereas the first two columns repeat,
for comparison, the two cases considered in Section 4.4 (where we insisted on Strict
coding for type).
As can be seen in Table A.3, our main result that the smooth model outperforms
the ˛-MEU model for ambiguity-sensitive subjects is robust to the coding used, in the
sense that in all cases shown the sign-matching rate exceeds the sign-zero rate by at
least 25 percentage points. However, the result becomes less pronounced under looser
coding as we move from left to right along any row of the table, with both sample size
and the excess of the sign-matching rate over the sign-zero rate falling.
37. We consider Strict and Loose coding for signs of premia, as in the main text, and all three codings
for type. We consider that it does not make sense to use a looser coding for type than for sign of premium,
as type is obtained from certainty-equivalents elicited next to one another.
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Appendix B: Nonexpected Utility for Risk
A possible concern about our theoretical analysis of preference over the acts is its use
of expected utility theory as the underlying model of choice under risk. In this respect,
our analysis is true to the smooth ambiguity and ˛-MEU models as usually formulated.
But, as there is evidence from many experiments that subjects deviate from expected
utility theory under risk (Starmer 2000), we might wonder how the theoretical analysis
would be affected if this were true of our subjects too. It is possible to imagine more
general formulations of these models that allow an induced probability distribution on
consequences to be evaluated by a quite general nonexpected utility functional (see,
e.g., the discussion of Corollary 1 in KMM). In this appendix, we show that our testing
strategy for distinguishing between the ˛-MEU and the smooth ambiguity models, and
our conclusions about the relative support of each model in the data, would be robust
to such reformulation.
An act together with a given probability distribution on the state space induces
a probability distribution on consequences. Since consequences may be lotteries, the
induced distribution is, in general, a distribution over lotteries and hence, a two-
stage lottery. Both the ˛-MEU and the smooth ambiguity model, in their standard
formulations, evaluate such an induced distribution just as an expected utility model
would (see, e.g., Klibanoff et al. 2012, equations 1.1 and 1.2). In particular, the induced
two-stage lottery is evaluated by reducing it to the corresponding one-stage lottery and
computing the expected utility of the reduced lottery. We now consider a reformulation
of the evaluation of such induced probability distributions that is more general than
expected utility.
For brevity, we consider only a domain of induced probability distributions
comprising one-stage and two-stage objective lotteries defined on the set of final
monetary consequences used in our experiment, that is, on f€20, €0g. Let preferences
over such lotteries be represented by maximization of any real-valued function
V, defined on the lotteries, such that (i) preferences respect first-order stochastic
dominance and (ii) V satisfies the following Limited Reduction condition: V(ff€20,
1
2
; €0, 1
2
g, r; f€0, 1g, 1–rgg) D V(f€20, r/2; €0, 1–(r/2)g for any 1 > r > 0. Notice
that, Limited Reduction is much weaker than the standard reduction principle for
compound lotteries and does not, by itself, impose any restriction on preferences over
one-stage lotteries. It simply links preferences over two-stage lotteries of a particularly
simple form to preferences over particular one-stage lotteries, in the way specified.
This would be quite compatible, for example, with preferences over one-stage lotteries
being generated by cumulative probability weighting with a distorted (monotonic)
weighting function.
We now generalize the ˛-MEU and smooth ambiguity models by using
maximization of V, defined as above, in place of maximization of the expectation
of u, as their representation of preferences with a given probability distribution on
the state space. How are the acts considered in the experiment evaluated under this
generalization? To compress notation, let V(f€20, 0.4; €0, 0.6g) D x, V(f€20, 0.25;
€0, 0.75g D y, and V(f€20, 0.1; €0, 0.9gg) D z. From first-order stochastic dominance,
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TABLE B.1. Values of V.
p1 p2 p3 p4
f1 z z x xf2 z x z x
mix z y y x
g1 y y y y
g2 y x z y
x > y > z. Applying Limited Reduction where necessary, the values of V for each act
and deck composition are given in Table B.1 (to be compared with Table 3 in the main
text).
From here, the theoretical analysis of the 2-ball condition can proceed essentially
just as in the main text. For the ˛-MEU model, as generalized in the preceding
paragraph, the DM’s preferences must satisfy f1  f2  mix. For the smooth ambiguity
model, as generalized in the preceding paragraph (but imposing, as in the main text,
that (p2) D (p3)), the DM’s preferences must satisfy the conditions that f1  f2,
and that, for f 2 ff1, f2g, g1  g2 , mix  f; g1  g2 , mix  f; and g1  g2 ,
mix  f. Thus, the predictions of Section 2.2 about how preferences over acts in ff1,
f2, mixg are (or are not) related to preferences over fg1, g2g under the two models
are robust to the generalizations of the preceding paragraph. What matters for those
predictions is just that preferences over one-stage lotteries satisfy first-order stochastic
dominance and cohere with preferences over two-stage lotteries to the extent required
by Limited Reduction. This is compatible with departures from expected utility theory
in preferences over one-stage objective risk, even quite marked departures.
Appendix C: Divide Across Models
For concreteness in the main text, it was convenient to analyze and interpret the results
purely in terms of the ˛-MEU model and the smooth ambiguity model. However,
the divide between models addressed by our design is broader, as we explain in this
appendix. Consider the formal representation of the setting in our experiment. Think
of P as the set of probabilities (on the set of states S D fB1, B2, R1, R2g) in an
˛-MEU model, or the set of probabilities in the core of the convex capacity in the
representation of a Schmeidler (1989) model of uncertainty aversion, or the support of
 in a smooth ambiguity model. Let Z denote a component, Z D B, R. With slight abuse
of terminology, let B1 and R1 be the “first” elements of their respective component and
B2 and R2 be the “second” elements. (For interpretation, B1 equals spade, B2 equals
club, R1 equals heart, and R2 equals diamond.) Let Zi denote the ith element from the
Zth-component, i D 1, 2. Denote the set of probabilities of drawing a first element
from the Zth component by Z D fp.Z1/ W p 2 Pg . Let P satisfy the following
properties:
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PROPERTY ONE. R D B .
PROPERTY TWO. Z is nonsingleton, for Z D fB, Rg.
PROPERTY THREE. If q 2 R and q0 2 B, there is p 2 P such that p (R1) D q and p
(B1) D q0.
PROPERTY FOUR. If p 2 P , then p (fZ1, Z2g) D 0.5.
In our experiment, in the 2-ball condition that implements the theoretical setup of
Section 2.2, the information given to subjects satisfies all four properties. Proposition
3.1 in Klibanoff et al. (2012) shows how the predictions of the ˛-MEU model
and the smooth ambiguity model differ when Properties One through Four are
assumed.38,39 Preferences of the Schmeidler (1989) model under uncertainty aversion
(i.e., with a convex capacity representation) coincide with those in an MEU model
where the representation set of probabilities is the core of the convex capacity.40
Hence, a Schmeidler model under uncertainty aversion whose convex capacity in
the representation has a core that satisfies Properties One through Four will share the
predictions of an ˛-MEU (with ˛ D 1) as specified in Proposition 3.1. In particular, this
implies that there will be no strict preference for the mixed act over its constituents in
the 2-ball condition. An example of a capacity whose core satisfies the four properties
is a belief function : 2S ! [0, 1], satisfying the following further conditions:  (Z1)
D r D (Z2), 0.2  r > 0;  (fZ1, Z2g) D 0.5.41
However, under the 1-ball condition, the subject’s information violates Property
Three, since the information implies that p(R1) D p(B1). Under such a restriction, the
ambiguity in each component resolves in an identical way implying mixing cannot in
38. For the case of the smooth ambiguity model, Proposition 3.1 further assumes that the weights  are
uniform. This assumption is, of course, consistent with the information given to subjects under both 1-ball
and 2-ball conditions. But the assumption is not necessary for the application to the theoretical setup of
Section 2.2 provided (p2) D (p3).
39. As was noted in footnote 2, the formal details of the setup in Klibanoff et al. (2012) are slightly
different from what we have here. In particular, they have a product state space, unlike here. So, Property
Four stated here does not apply literally to their setup. However, the belief about each component of the
product space is unambiguous: it is a probability known to the DMs. Hence, the substantive element of
Property Four is implicitly assumed in Proposition 3.1, even though the assumption is not explicitly stated
in the proposition.
40. A convex capacity is a set function : 2S ! [0, 1], (E)  0, (S) D 1, (E [ F)  (E) C (F)  (E \
F). Every convex capacity  has a nonempty core, a compact, convex set of probability measures defined as
follows: P./  Core./  fp 2 .S/jp.E/  .E/; for all E 	 .S/g, where (S) denotes the set of all
probability measures on S. Furthermore, .E/ D min
p2P./p.E/. A belief function (also known as a totally
monotone capacity) satisfies a stronger version of the third property specified for a convex capacity: for
every n > 0 and every collection E
1
; : : : ;E
n
2 2S ; 

[n
iD1
E
i

 P
If1;:::;ng;I¤;
.1/jI jC1

\
i2I
E
i

,
where |I| denotes the cardinality of I.
41. In Jaffray (1989), the model is a special case of ˛-MEU in that the set of probabilities is restricted to be
given by the core of a belief function. In Jaffray’s presentation, the set of probabilities represents objectively
given imprecise information. Gul and Pesendorfer (2014) axiomatize a fully subjective, “Savage-style”
version of Jaffray’s “von Neumann–Morgenstern-style” model. Olszewski (2007) posits and axiomatizes
an ˛-MEU style model with an objectively given set of probabilities (on outcomes). Gajdos et al.’s (2008)
“contraction” model, which falls in the MEU class, also takes the set of probabilities as objectively given
to the DM. All these models share the prediction of the MEU model in our experiment.
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any way help with ambiguity hedging. As Klibanoff et al. (2012) point out, in this case
the smooth model will, like the ˛-MEU model, also predict indifference to mixing.
Notice, given the set of probability distributions fp1, . . . , p4g in Table 2, if a DM
weights the distributions uniformly, the reduced probability measure on S under the
1-ball condition is the same as that under the 2-ball condition.42 Thus, under the
information available to the subjects, it is natural to expect that a probabilistically
sophisticated DM (Machina and Schmeidler 1992) will choose the same way under
the 1-ball and 2-ball conditions. An example of a probabilistically sophisticated DM
is a rank-dependent utility maximizer a` la Quiggin (1982). A rank-dependent utility
preference is another prominent member of the class of preferences representable as
a Choquet expected utility (CEU). Such a preference is represented by a capacity
obtained via a distortion of the probability measure on outcomes induced (jointly) by
the given probability measure on S and an act. Hence, a subject in the experiment with
such preferences, given the information available, should not choose differently under
1-ball and 2-ball conditions, since the reduced probability measure on states is identical
under both conditions. Thus, these preferences do not predict a difference between the
premia under the two conditions. In this sense, the prediction of rank-dependent utility
is similar to that of an MEU preference rather than to that of a smooth ambiguity
preference. Thus, two very prominent types of CEU preferences, the uncertainty-
averse Schmeidler model and the rank-dependent expected utility model, may be seen
to share the predictions of the MEU model taking into account the information available
to the subjects.43
Turning to the other side of the divide, we note first that the models of Ahn (2008),
Ergin and Gul (2009), Nau (2006), Nielsen (2010), and Seo (2009) have substantial
subcategories that share the same functional form representation with the smooth
ambiguity model, and these must share the predictions of the smooth model in our
main experiment. Second, a smooth ambiguity preference with the ambiguity attitude
function '(.) given by a negative exponential (constant absolute ambiguity aversion)
is a Variational preference (Maccheroni et al. 2006). Third, given the set of probability
distributions fp1, . . . , p4g in Table 2, if a DM weights the distributions uniformly, a
smooth ambiguity preference is also a vector expected utility (VEU) preference since
the sufficient conditions noted in Table II (p. 826) of Siniscalchi (2009) are then met.
42. Actually, the assumption of a uniform distribution is not necessary for the conclusion in the context
of our experiment. The reduced probability on suits is the same in the 1-ball and 2-ball conditions, for any
subject who obtains it by (standard) reduction from probability distributions over the possible compositions
and for whom the latter conform with the information given. The significance of the italicized phrase is that,
in order for the claim to hold, the DM must treat the draws from the opaque bag that determine, respectively,
deck 2, the Black-component of deck 3, and the Red-component of deck 3 as separate realizations of the
same process. Given this, it does not matter whether the DM thinks “1” and “4” equally probable in that
process.
43. It is possible to have instances of CEU utility preferences that ignore part of the information available
to the subjects and make predictions in our experiment akin to the smooth ambiguity model. Simon Grant
gave us an example of such a convex capacity which violated Property Four and had choice implications
like the smooth ambiguity model in the 2-ball condition case. Peter P. Wakker has also explained to us
about these possibilities.
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These points are illustrative. They are sufficient to show that our main experiment’s
results also support these models in so much as they support the smooth ambiguity
model. But, of course, there may be other possibilities too (and, as discussed in Section
5, the equivalence does not in all cases carry over into our follow-up experiment).
Finally, it is apparent that our discussion of the divide between models exploits
Properties One–Four. Thus, it does not rule out the possibility that the divide between
models could be different if the beliefs of subjects about our 2-ball condition depart
from those properties. Just as with our discrimination between ˛-MEU and smooth
ambiguity models in the main text, our discrimination between broader classes of
models is also contingent on grounded assumptions about beliefs.
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